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THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW.
The object of this paper is to .suggest the necessity of more
general attention being given to the study of Roman law in our
institutions for legal education. No apology ought to be re-
quired, and yet I feel that I ought to offer one, for bringing up
a matter in which the majority of instructors and students take
so slight an interest.
It is, I believe, generally conceded that the ever-rising stand-
ard of general education and knowledge in the country necessi-
tates a higher standard of professional education among lawyers,
if they are to keep pace with the general improvement around
them, and retain their old position as leaders of the nation.
Our principal law schools have, I think, recognized this, as is
shown in the tendency to raise the qualifications for admission,
to increase the length of the course leading to the degree, and
to establish post-graduate courses in which much attention is
directed to the scientific study of law.
Legal education, like every other institution of permanent
benefit to society, mounts towards perfection by a process of
evolution in which each improvement becomes the stepping
stone to, or point of departure for, some further advance in
efficiency.
The student of law in the United States is to-day in a more
favored position than is the student in any other English-speak-
ing country in the world.
In England, even so far back as the last century, the want of
means for acquiring a scientific knowledge of law was keenly felt.
Blackstone in the introduction to his commentaries, says, "The
evident want of some assistance in the rudiments of legal knowl-
edge has given birth to a practice, which, if ever it had grown
to be general, must have proved of extremely pernicious conse-
quence. I mean the custom by some so very warmly recom-
mended, of dropping all liberal education, as of no use to stu-
dents in the law, and placing them, in its stead, at the desk of
some skillful attorney, in order to initiate them early in all the
depths of practice and render them more dextrous in the
mechanical part of business. * * * Experience mayteach us
to foretell that a lawyer thus educated to the bar in subservience
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to attorneys and solicitors, will find he has begun at the wrong
end. If practice be the whole he is taught, practice must also
be the whole he will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the ele-
ments and first principles upon which the rule of practice is
founded the least variation from established precedents will
totally distract and bewilder him; ita lex scripta est is the utmost
his knowledge will arrive at, he must never aspire to form, and
seldom expect to comprehend any arguments drawn a priori from
the spirit of the laws, and the natural foundation 
of justice."I
The hope expressed by Blackstone for a more systematic and
scientific mode of legal education in England has hardly been
realized, and indeed the practice he objected to did become gen-
eral. Thus, about one hundred years later, in 1871, Markby, in
the introduction to his "Elements of Law," writes as follows:
"Until very lately the only study of law known in England was
that preparation for the actual practice of the profession which
was procured by attendance in the chambers of a barrister or
pleader. The universities had almost entirely ceased to teach
law, and there was nowhere in England any faculty, or body of
learned persons, who made it their business to give instruction in
law after a systematic method. Nor were there any persons de-
sirotis of learning law after that fashion. Forensic skill, skill
in the art of drawing up legal documents, and skillfulness in the
advice given to clients, were all that was taught, or learned, by a
process of initiation very similar to that in which an apprentice
learns a handicraft, or a schoolboy learns a game." 
2 And
about two years ago, at a meeting of leading lawyers to consider
the question of legal education, the Lord Chief-Justice deplored
the lack of scientific legal instruction and remarked that the law
of England had become "a mere nice discrimination between
decided cases. "
It seems probable that the system by which the English, and
later the American, law has grown and developed accounts for
the indifference which, until recent times, has been shown to
,scientific legal education. "Few persons who have not made a
special study of the law can have any notion of the wonderfully
uneven manner in vhich its growth has proceeded. Law being
made in this country [England] mostly through litigation, the
casual exigencies of litigation determine what parts of it shall
be filled up and what left incomplete." 
8
1 Introduction to "Commentaries," pp. 31, 32.
2 Introduction to "Elements of Law," p. ix.
8 Sir F. Pollock, "Essays in Jurisprudence and Etbics," p. 67.
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Law which has grown up in such a chance way would seem,
at first sight, incapable of scientific treatment. There is no sci-
ence, however much convenience, in opportunism. And if our
law had indeed been merely the outcome of a mass of judicial
decisions made to fit the individual cases adjudged, it would be a
hard task for the scientific investigator to bring order out of such
chaos. But, happily, the principles underlying these multitudi-
nous decisions are, after making allowance for local customs and
institutions, mainly those which underlie every system of juris-
prudence knowti to the civilized world. Maine, in his "Ancient
Law," shows how curious has been the actual process by which
our law has been developed by judicial decisions, or case law.
"When a group of facts comes before an English Court for
adjudication the whole course of the discussion assumes that no
question is, or can be, raised which will call for the application
of any principles but old ones, or of any distinctions but such as
have long since been allowed. Yet the moment the judgment
has been rendered and reported we slide unconsciously or una-
vowedly into a new language, and a new train of thought. We
now admit that the new decision has modified the law." 4 Maine
explains this curious anomaly by the fact that a belief originally
existed that there was somewhere "a complete, coherent, sym-
metrical body of English law, of an amplitude sufficient to fur-
nish principles which would apply to any conceivable combina-
tion of circumstances." 5 Whence came this sufficient body of
law? "There is some reason to suspect that the judges of the
Thirteenth century drew, in secret, freely, though not always
wisely, from current compendia of the Roman and Canon laws." 6
However this may be, our legal system grew generation after
generation, expanding to meet the requirements of the people,
and perhaps, as time passed on, not fully conscious of the
amount of its indebtedness to that Roman jurisprudence to
which it always denied authority. Hatred of foreign domina-
tion and of foreign manners and customs made the English peo-
ple doggedly refuse to accept a system of jurisprudence, how-
ever refined and however far in advance of their own compara-
tively rude legal conceptions, because it was introduced to them
by the foreign ecclesiastics whom they distrusted and despised.
But the work in private law of the great jurisconsults of
Rome in the discovery of the principles that lay back of the law
4 "Ancient Law," p. 30.
5 "Ancient Law," p. 31.
6 "Ancient Law," p. 31.
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governing the mutual dealings of men, was of so universal and
permanent a character that these principles necessarily found
their way, secretly perhaps but not less surely, into the English
law. Speaking of the work accomplished by the Roman jurists
in this direction, Sohm says, "The problem here (i. e., in work-
ing out the principles of a free and equitable law for the mutual
dealings of men, such as the legal effect of conditions, the con-
tractual liability for negligence, etc.) was to discover the true
nature of the dealings themselves, to trace the unexpressed and
unconscious intention underlying all such dealings, and, having
done so, to put it into words, to clothe it in a form in which defi-
niteness and lucidity should be coupled with a degree of compre-
hensiveness sufficient to bring out the broad general principle
governing, not merely a large number of cases, but positively
all cases, including those which were peculiar and exceptional.
-Such a problem touched rather the creation than the application
of law. * * * The genius of Roman jurisprudence * * *
gave little thought to the abstract conception of law of owner-
ship, or of liability, * * * but with regard to the conse-
quences involved in the abstract conception of ownership or of
liability, its natural instinct was never at fault for a single
moment. And nowhere was this unique power more conspicu-
ously displayed than in the way the Roman jurists, so to speak,
hit upon the precise requirements of bona fides in human deal-
ings, and applied them to individual cases." 
7 Primitive Roman
law, like that of all other legal systems in their early stage, con-
sisted of outward and ceremonious formalities, the exact observ-
ance of which was the only requisite to the validity of the trans-
action. The intention, the will, the agreement of the minds
which really lay babk of the transaction and formed the real
reason or cause of it, were totally disregarded. From this dry
skeleton of formalism the Roman jurists slowly, and with cau-
tious steps, evolved the truth, i. e., that the formalities were
nothing, the intention was everything. Let me illustrate this
by a short account of the most important of the services rendered
by the Romans to the jurisprudence of all nations and times, the
evolution of the contract, as described by Maine in the ninth
chapter of his "Ancient Law." A contract, as understood by
the Romans, was a convention plus an obligation, the latter be-
ing the element which made the transaction binding. Now con.
tracts were classified as follows: The Verbal, the Literal, the
Real, and the Consensual.
7 - Institutes of Roman Law," pp. 72, 73.
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In the Verbal Contract, the oldest of all, when the conven-
tion was reached it was necessary to clothe it in a certain
"technical phraseology, specially appropriated to the particular
occasion." In this contract the stipulation or solemn form of
words alone constituted and created the legal obligation. Next,
in the Literal Contract, the "formal act by which an obligation
was superinduced on the convention, was an entry of the sum
due, where it could be specifically ascertained, on the debit side
of a ledger." There is some obscurity as to the exact manner
in which this contract was created, but it turns ol "a point of
Roman domestic manners, the systematic character and ex-
ceeding regularity of book-keeping in ancient times." But the
point to be observed is that in this contract when the entry was
made all formalities were dispensed with, and the contract was
complete. "This is another step downwards in the history of
contract law."
We now come to the Real Contract, which again shows "a
great advance in ethical conceptions." When the convention
had been for the delivery of a specific thing, the simple delivery
of the thing gave rise to the obligation without further for-
mality. In other words, "performance on one side is allowed to
impose a legal duty on the other, evidently on ethical grounds.
For the first time then, moral considerations appear as an ingre-
dient in contract law."
Lastly, we have the Consensual Contract, in which the "Con-
sensus or mutual assent .of the parties is the final and crowning
ingredient in the convention, * * * and as soon as the
assent of the parties has supplied this ingredient there is at once
a contract." Thus in this contract the mutual assent has the
same effect in causing the obligation to attach to the convention,
as has the form of words, the written entry, and the perform-
ance on one side in the Verbal, Literal, and Real contracts,
respectively.
The Consensual Contracts were limited, being only four in
number, viz., Agency, Partnership, Sale, and Letting and Hir-
ing. "But it cannot be doubted that they constituted the stage
in the history of contract law from which all modem concep-
tions of contract took their start. The motion of the will which
constitutes agreement was now completely insulated, and be-
came the subject of separate contemplation; forms were entirely
eliminated from the notion of contract, and external acts were
only regarded as symbols of the internal act of volition." In
this connection Sohm observes, "The department of law where
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the peculiar genius of the Roman jurists found full scope is the
law of obligations, the law of debtor and creditor, the law, in
other words, which is most properly concerned with the mutual
dealings between man and man; and here again it is more espe-
cially the law relating to those contracts where not merely the
expressed, but also the unexpressed intention of the parties has
to be taken into account. And in regard to this unexpressed
intention which is not, for the greater part, present to the mind
of the party himself at the moment of concluding the contract, it
was the Roman jurists who discovered it, and discovered it for
all time to come, and enunciated the laws which result from its
existence. This is a task which will never have to be done over
again. And at the same time, they clothed these laws in a form
which will remain a model for all future ages." 8 It cannot be
doubted, and it is now, indeed, generally acknowledged, that
the English law, in its early formative period, owed much to
Roman law.
Professor James Hadley, after alluding to the "feeling less
favourable than mere indifference, a tinge of jealousy or repug-
nance" with which may practitioners and professors of the com-
mon law have regarded the civil law, shows that the influence of
the civil law on the theory and practice of law in English has
been felt in many ways and to a very great extent. Thus,
through the ecclesiastical courts much of the procedure and
principles of the civil law with regard to wills, intestacy and
administration, passed into the English system. Through the
Court of Chancery, presided over as it was for a long -period by
an ecclesiastic, the doctrines and methods of the civil law re-
garding equitable jurisdiction, became a part of the system of
English equity. And, lastly, Professor Hadley shows that in
commercial and maritime law the English law is largely indebted
to the civil law, the reason being that early English private law
was almost exclusively a law of real estate, personal property
receiving scarcely any attention. Therefore when trade and
business relations developed and became more complicated, it
lecame necessary for English judges to find principles to meet
the new demands. "In the civil law they found ready to their
hand a store of such principles, carefully worked out and copi-
ously illustrated. * * * It is not surprising that the English
judges should have adopted them in their decisions, and so incor-
porated them into the English law." 9 The steadily growing
8 ,, Institutes of Roman Law," p. 74.
9 Hadley's ,' Introduction to Roman Law," pp. 43-48.
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opinion that law is a science and should be studied as such has
necessarily done much to remove that "ignorance of Roman law
which Englishmen (and I may add Americans) readily confess,
and of which they are sometimes not ashamed to boast." 10
The exclusion from our course of study of a system to which
we are so much indebted seems to be explicable only on the ground
that we have not entirely passed, in our process of evolution,
from the old ideas* to the new. A law school, like an army, con-
sists, after all, of its rank and file-that is, of its students-and
law schools must provide those courses which find most favor
with those who are to attend them.
"'Institutions," says Professor E. J. Phelps, in an article on
Legal Education in this journal, "must meet the demands
of their times, right or wrong, or they will soon cease to be in-
stitutions, for the lack of disciples." And I think that the
majority of law students would consider, like their English con-
freres as described by Markby earlier in this article, that "foren-
sic skill, skill in the art of drawing up legal documents, and
skillfulness in the advice given to clients" are all that can, or
ought to be, learned in a law school course. But still I hope
that the time is coming when those who enter our law schools
will do so with the intention of studying law rather than of
learning it, of understanding its principles as well as of becom-
ing proficients in its practice. The immense development of law
in the United States and the enormous mass of reported de-
cisions issued yearly from its numerous courts, tend, as it seems
to me, to render it more necessary for the student to spend much
of his period of legal study in becoming acquainted with the
principles upon which this ever-growing mass of law is based.
To attempt adequately to cover the entire field of practical law
in a two or even a three-year's course, seems to be impossible,
and it may be, perhaps, in declining to attempt it, that the Uni-
versity Law School may take its next step in advance. The
vast and rapid growth of the law tends to the growth of special-
ties in its various branches, and perhaps it may be the function
of the Law School of the not distant future to devote the larger
part of its course to a thorough grounding in the principles of
law and the cultivation of habits of correct reasoning, the
remainder of the course being given to the special branch of law
which the student expects to practice. To cite Professor E. J.
Phelps again, "The very first and indispensable requisite in
10 "Ancient Law," p. 347.
11 YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. L, No. 4, P. 143 (March, 1892).
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legal education, without which there can be none that is worthy
of the name, is the acquisition of a clear and accurate percep-
tion, a complete knowledge, a strong, tenacious grasp of those
unchangeable principles of the common law which underlie and
permeate its whole structure, and which control all its details,
its consequences, its application to human affairs. That should
be the work of the law school, to the student who is happy
enough to enjoy its privileges. If it does that for him, it does
quite enough, and all there is time for." 12
And Markby expresses the same view of the function of the
University Law School when he says, "But it is only with the
earliest, and what I may call the preliminary portion of a law-
yer's education that a University has to deal. * * * The
only preparation and grounding which a University is either
able, or, I suppose, would be desirous to give, is in law con-
.sidered as a science; or, at least, if that is not yet possible, in law
considered as a collection of principles capable of being syste-
matically arranged, and resting, not on bare authority, but on
sound logical deduction." 13
Much has undoubtedly been done already in our law schools
in the direction of teaching of the kind just mentioned, but much
more remains yet to be accomplished. Judge Dillon in his
Storrs' lectures in r891 expresses the opinion that the actual
course of instruction in our law schools is too intensely practical
and technical, and that the course can have and should have a
broader scope than it has when the student is confined, to the
usual text-books written for practicing lawyers, and the desig-
nated illustrative cases, since the oral instruction rarely goes
beyond this range. He then continues, "To supply this want
the civil law, for puiposes of comparative jurisprudence and be-
cause of its more orderly and scientific arrangements, should, in
its great outlines and essential character, be made an element
of instruction to a greater extent than it is in our American law
schools. Except in this view and in this incidental or subordi-
nate way, I doubt its utility in the short course of legal study to
which our law colleges are confined. I have long been of
opinion that less than a three-years' course of study ought not
to be adopted."',
14
Is not Judge Dillon's criticism a true one? Are we not
somewhat in danger, in our anxiety to fit our student for imme-
12 YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol, I., No. 4, P- 140.
18 ", Elements of Law," p. xi.
14 ," Lectures on Law and Jurisprudence," p. 86.
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diate practice, of losing sight of the importance of a thorough
grounding in the principles of the science they expect to apply?
Professor Phelps says, in the article cited above, "I would con-
fine, therefore, the business of the law school, were it left to
me, chiefly to the groundwork of the law. This I would try to
have taught with extreme thoroughness. And I would regard
mental discipline, habits of thought and the learning how to,
think clearly, accurately, and with the confidence that can only
come from the consciousness of a sure foundation, as far more
important than the premature accumulation of much knowl-
edge." 15 It seems to me that where the period of study is ex-
tended from two to three years, more systematic instruction
should be given in the science of law. Every student ought to
participate in it, and it should no longer be considered an agree-
able but by no means necessary part of a student's legal educa-
tion, a kind of interesting inquiry to be pursued in a leisurely
manner by the few whose pocket-books or predilections suggest
a post-graduate course as a pleasant addendum to the necessary
period of study. And in the study of law as a science the
Roman law must, in its "broad outlines and essential charac-
ter," take a prominent place. Surely, the time has come when
we may rise above the prejudices and objections handed down
to us from the past, and no longer refuse to avail ourselves of
the treasures of legal knowledge to be obtained from the corpus
juris. Let us not forget that this body of law is the acknowl-
edged foundation of every system of jurisprudence in use in the
civilized world, except our own, and that, even in our own,
there is much that has been taken, though not acknowledged,
from this source. Roman law is no archaic effete system, the
mouldy rubbish of a society and a civilization long since worn
out, but "the most celebrated system of jurisprudence known to
the world," and one which has profoundly influenced not only
the legal but the moral and religious ideas of the world in all
ages. Moreover, in its bearing on international law, it has fur-
nished the common ground on which nations can equitably
adjust their differences.
In its ethical aspect Roman law is the source from which
ideas of the profoundest importance to the political and social
development of the world have arisen. Both in its legal and
ethical aspects its study is of great practical importance to the
American lawyer of the future.
The constant flow of immigration into the United States
15 YALE LAW JOURNAL," VoL I., No. 4, PP- 142, 143.
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brings large numbers of citizens of foreign countries whose legal
systems are founded on the Roman law. The greater facilities
of intercourse enable these strangers to maintain, as they could
not in earlier times, their family connections in their native
lands. From this intercourse will doubtless arise many matters
requiring professional advice, and in giving such advice the
American lawyer with some knowledge of Roman law will be in
a sounder and more advantageous position.
In its wider aspect, by which I mean its influence on politi-
cal and social ideas, it will be of even greater value to him in
the time to come. For lawyers, unless they fall behind in the
general advance in education, must exercise very great influence
on the course of national affairs. And it is becoming more and
more important, in view of the growing preponderance in public
affairs of those who are the possessors of that little knowledge
which is proverbially so dangerous, that there should be a body
of men in the country acquainted with the origin of many of
the prominent ideas of the times, and thereby able to sift the
grain of good from the chaff of passion or prejudice, and compe-
tent to interpose a barrier of calm, deliberate conviction against
the winds of ignorant or emotional theories. It would take me
too far into the subject to set forth in detail how the study of
Roman law and of works for the full comprehension of which
some knowledge of Roman law is necessary not only extends
but steadies the mental vision in legal political and social mat-
ters. It should not be neccessary to urge this at all, but.were
the influence of Roman law known there would be no need to
urge its study. With the existing excellent organization of
American law schools I think that the opportunity for vastly
improving our system of legal education and of removing from
ourselves a matter of reproach, is very favorable. But some
change must come over our ideas on the subject of law school
training before this opportunity can be taken advantage of. As
long as Roman law is a required study only for the compara-
tively few who take Master's or Doctor's degrees, the reputation
of the school does not suffer much. But I fear that according
to our present ideas if Roman law were made a required subject
in the undergraduate course the deadly epithet "impractical"
would fall on the school, and wither it away. And yet, as it
seems to me, there is now the fairest opportunity for the United
States to obtain the honor of being the first of the English-
speaking nations to teach its law in a manner worthy its impor-
tance. In England, as I have shown above, the influence of the
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past has hitherto been too powerful to permit any real change
in the methods of legal education. But even there the necessity
for improvement is recognized, and it is probable that some
measures must soon be taken to remedy the existing condition.
But before any real improvement can be effected it will be incum-
bent upon the reformers to organize a law school or law schools
in which proper instruction can be given.
In this country the organization is in full force; all that is
wanted is to give effect to the process of evolution that has been
going on in legal educAtion since the Declaration of Independ-
ence. When the United States proclaimed their independence
they adopted so much of the common law of England as was
consistent with their altered circumstances. They probably
adopted also, for the time at least, the English ideas and system
of legal education. But the establishment of regular law
schools marked a distinct advance on those old ideas, although
the past has been sufficiently powerful to impart to the new sys-
tem some of the prejudices and imperfections of the old. I
think, however, that in the not-distant future the legal education
provided by our universities will reach its full logical develop-
ment in offering to students not merely an opportunity to make
themselves good legal workmen, but good sound lawyers as
well. No institution can continue to exist with benefit to the
community without obeying its inherent natural law of develop-
ment and advancement. I venture to suggest that when law
schools were first instituted their founders, however convinced
of their utility, hardly foresaw the possibilities opened up by
them. So strong are old prejudices that the law school seems
at first to have entered into a kind of timid competition with the
office of the practicing lawyer, and to have found it sometimes
necessary to offer soinething that was almost an apology for its
existence beside the older system. But the times were with it
and it prospered, keeping, however, "the office" in mind, its
courses of instruction bearing traces of this solicitude.
I do not think I am wrong in regarding the establishment of
post-graduate courses as one of the most important steps in the
advance of the law school in usefulness and independence. It
showed thereby that it recognized the high character and far-
reaching importance of the work to which it had set its hand.
It indicated thereby that the function of the law school was not
complete when it had afforded such instruction as the office
might offer, though perhaps more systematically and conveniently
arranged. The sources of law, its origin, nature, extent, limi-
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tations, and a comparison of different systems of law now came
to be recognized as matters important for the student's atten-
tion. Here the advance seems to have been arrested for the
time, more in appearance, perhaps, than in reality.
The next step will be, I hope and believe, to require every
student to take, in his undergraduate course, some at least of the
studies now reserved for the post-graduate years. Included in
these studies should be Roman law "in," (to repeat Judge Dillon's
words) "its great outlines and essential character," and "because
of its more orderly and scientific arrangement." The benefit
to the student of a course in Roman law as a mere legal study
consists -in opening out to him the source of many of the legal
conceptions he is meeting with in American law, and in spread-
ing before him, in clear, striking manner, the principles upon
which these legal conceptions are based.
I know that there is a very strong prejudice against the
study of Roman law, but I think that the more it is studied the
weaker will the prejudice become. For I feel sure that every
American lawyer who has honestly studied Roman law will
acknowledge that his acquaintance with it renders him more
capable of dealing with the problems and difficulties presented
by the jurisprudence of his own country.
W. F. Foster.
NEW YORK CITY, February 1, 1898.
